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Using a structural model where the decision to search is endogenous, 
we analyze how various parameters such as the mean wage offer, the 
search costs, the offer probability and the value of non-market time can 
explain the gender wage gap. The model, which is implemented on a 
sample of young Canadian women who suffered a permanent job dis­
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For several decades, labor economists have tried to explain the existence of 
the wage gender gap. As in most western countries, women have constantly 
increased their share of the labour force, the interest in the persistence of a 
significant difference in wages paid to female versus male workers has grown 
steadily. Recent work on the issue include Blau and Kahn (1992, 1994), Light 
and Ureta (1995), O’Neill and Polachek (1993). To date, economists have re­
tained two fundamental economic frameworks to understand the gender wage 
gap; human capital theory and statistical discrimination.
In the human capital approach (which dates back to Mincer and Polachek, 
1974), the gender wage gap is explained by the fact that females are relatively 
more productive in household activities than males. For this reason, they tend 
to invest less in labor market oriented human capital or tend to work in oc­
cupations which do not require heavy human capital investments. The gender 
wage gap is therefore the results of discontinuous work pattern expectations.
The literature on discrimination has, on the other hand, focused on the 
differential treatment of male and females workers otherwise identical. The 
notion of discrimination, dating back to Becker (1971), is based on the fact 
that employers, facing uncertainty about individual productivity or individual 
labour force attachment, must sometimes focus on observed differences between 
groups (males and females) when hiring new workers. As a result, women may 
systematically receive lower wages or may be excluded from various occupations 
(see Lundberg and Startz, 1983, for an example).
The approach to the wage gender wage gap suggested in this paper is 
quite different than all previous work mentioned and has, to our knowledge, 
never been pursued before1. In this paper, we investigate the gender differences 
in Job Search outcomes which take place following a permanent job displace­
ment. We analyze a sample of young males and females in various industries 
(most women in our sample are however working in the Services and the Man­
ufacturing industries) and use a structural job search (dynamic programming) 
model to investigate their search behaviour. The model has several distinct 
features. First, the decision to search is endogenous. Using data on the will­
ingness to search for a new job upon displacement, we specify a model where 
both males and females may decide to drop out of the labour force. Secondly,
'However, Swaim and Podgursky (1994) have investigated, in a reduced-form framework, 



























































































unlike most structural models found in the literature, we make use of a rela­
tively large number of regressors to parameterize four most important aspects 
of the search process; the value of non-market time, the mean wage offer, the 
offer probability and search costs (rarely analyzed in the empirical literature). 
As a result, reservation wages are treated as a function of unknown parame­
ters and exogenous regressors and must be solved using dynamic programming 
principles. This allows us to avoid imposing homogeneity across individuals.
We believe that the investigation of the gender wage gap using a structural 
model is particularly promising. First, the imposition of all the restrictions 
imposed by the dynamic programming allows us to obtain separate estimates for 
all parameters of the mean wage offer and the reservation wage function. This 
means that we can actually compute how various regressors such the number of 
young children, marital status, education the search parameters (including the 
probability of receiving offers and search costs) impact on males and females 
differently. Notably, this can be achieved without having to impose exclusion 
restrictions such as needed in reduced-form analysis of female wage functions. 
In other words, our model allows us to distinguish between supply side versus 
demand side factors affecting the gender wage gap. Secondly, the tightness of the 
search problem has implications for the escape rate out unemployment and the 
probability of dropping out of the labour force (because we actually estimate a 
search model with endogenous decision to search). Our structural estimates can 
therefore be used to investigate gender differences in unemployment duration 
and on the incidence of non-participation upon job displacement.
The model is estimated with the Canadian Labour market activity Survey2. 
We use a sample of men and women who have experienced a permanent job dis­
placement. The likelihood function is based on information on the decision to 
search or not to search upon displacement (we refer to this as participation 
data), duration data and re-employment wages. At further stage, we also use 
information on the presence of young children as well as marital status to ex­
plain gender differences in job search behaviour.
The paper is constructed as follows. In the next section, the theoretical 
model is presented in details. Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of econo­
metric issues and the presentation of the likelihood function. The data set is 
presented in details in Section 4 while Section 5 is devoted to the presentation 
of the main results. The conclusion is in Section 6.





























































































2 A M odel w ith Endogenous Job Search
To investigate gender differences in job search outcome,we specify a stationary 
search model similar to the one estimated by Belzil and Zhang (1995) to in­
vestigate child care and search costs. The model is applied to both male and 
female workers (full-time) who are affected by a permanent job displacement. 
We disregard temporary layoffs. The model is constructed around the following 
assumptions.
1. Expected lifetime earnings are maximized over an infinite horizon and 
discounted at rate 0 — ^
2. Individuals receive at most one offer per period and the probability of 
receiving an offer is given by £.
3. The unemployed receive unemployment benefit b for each period of un­
employment.
4. The monetary cost of search activities (for each period) is denoted
5. For those who decide not to search, the value of non-market time (per 
period) is given by the following expression
= — exp(r1A')
Tl
which can be interpreted as the monetary value of the output produced 
at home. K denotes the number of young children at the time of the 
displacement.
6. We assume that job offers are indexed by an hourly wage rate and that, 
upon acceptance, a job is held forever. Wage offers are distributed with 
density
f(w ) =  Aexp(—A w)
Using the previous assumptions, it is straightforward to derive the value 
functions associated to each state. They are given by




























































































K  = b - r + 0e v (2)
(3)
where Ve(w) is the value of accepting employment at wage w, Vu is the 
value of unemployment (search) and Vn is the value of leaving the labour force 
to involve in household activities. The value of following the optimal policy in 
the future, EV, is given by
and where w* denotes the reemployment reservation wage (for those who 
decide to search and remain in the labour force) .
Equation (5) is sometimes called the ’’optimality condition”. The neces­
sary (and sufficient condition) to remain in the labour force and search (following 
displacement) is given by
(4)
which can be used to derive the equation for w* , that is
w* = b — 4/ + (5)
(6)





























































































In this section, we present the estimation strategy used to investigate the gen­
der wage gap and related issues. First, by allowing the decision to search to be 
endogenous, we avoid self-selection bias introduced if we were to sample only 
those women searching and therefore work with duration and wage data (such 
as it is typically done in the previous literature). To do so, we make use of the 
sample information on the willingness to search or not upon job displacement 
as reported in the LMAS.3 To take into account individual unobserved hetero­
geneity in the value of non market time, we allow the value of non-market time 
to incorporate a stochastic element. That is
pn =  a +  — exp(Tj/0 
T\
We assume that a  is normally distributed;
a  ~  Normal (0,<r2)
If we let Sj =  1 for those women who decided to search and 0 for those 
who dropped out and using the condition expressed in (6), the probability that 
a woman i will search is given by
P{Si =  1) =  P  [a < h(w*)] — $ M Oa
where




where $(.) denotes the standard normal cdf and where w* is given by the 
optimality condition ( 5). The probability that a woman decides not to search, 
P(Sj =  0), follows trivially from (8). As it is the case in most economic surveys of 
the unemployed, some of the individual reporting that they are searching are still 
unemployed by the end of the survey time. For those women, we only observe 
a censored unemployment duration. For those women who completed their 
unemployment spell, we observe a completed duration t< and a re-employment
3Our model is therefore distinct from those of Flinn and Heckman (1982) and Wolpin 




























































































hourly wage w,. Completed observations are indexed by the binary variable 
Cj =  1 while censored observations are indexed by c, =  0.
Given that a woman i decides to search, the probability that she is ob­
served reemployed at wage w, after t, periods or that she is still unemployed by 
the end of the survey time is given by
j ( l - £ 7 T « ) ) ‘‘ { ( 1 - £ * « ) ) * ' } '  *
where 7r(iu*) is the acceptance probability; that is the probability that an 
offer exceeds w*. The log likelihood function for the entire sample is therefore 
given by
i(A,n,r,0) = £  ]og(i-.[*taaiU £  iog$
»:Si=0 \  a  J/ i:Si= 1
HWj)'
log {(l-£7r(iu*))‘‘ 1̂ Aexp(-Atui)}c,{ ( l - ^ 7r(u;*))1‘ }1 "(9)
It is easy to see that the following parameters can be identified (and 
estimated); the variance of a  (tr), the parameter of the function representing 
productivity at home (ti), the wage offer distribution parameter (A), the search 
costs parameter (H')and the offer probability (£).4 Maximization of the log like­
lihood function is rendered difficult by the fact that, at each iteration , w* must 
be evaluated conditional on the values of the structural parameters. Using a 
Newton-Raphson procedure, the value of w* which solves this relationship can 
be obtained relatively easily although these calculations must be updated at 
each iteration needed to maximize the log likelihood function.5
4We set the discount rate 0 to a value of 20% per year.
5To do so, we make use of the optimality condition (equation 5) and we define the following 
implicit equation
g(w') = w' - b - t l  -  ^  exp(-Aw*) =  0
The reservation wage, at step p+ l, is defined as
ŵ =w^ - v k ) 9{w;)




























































































In order to introduce observed heterogeneity, we generalize the model 
to incorporate parametrization of the offer probability, search costs parameters 
the parameter representing home productivity and the mean wage offer . We 
allow the offer probability to depend on child status. This might be relevant 
if for instance, those women with young children searching for a new job are 
less flexible or have less time to devote to search activities. To take this into 
account, we specify the offer probability as
£ =  expfo +  ZiK)
where both £o and £1 are positive parameters.
Similar arguments can be applied to gender differentials in search costs. 
The presence of young children are likely to affect female search behaviour. In 
order to preserve positivity of the search costs, we specify as
*(.) =  r ( 7o +  7 1 1{K > 0)) -  .886
where T(.) denotes the gamma function and is given by
r(s) =  /  x5exp(-x)dx
Jo
and where I(.) denotes the indicator function.
A representative agent model can also be criticized for ignoring the fact 
that females with different level of education (human capital) do not search 
from a same distribution. In standard regression analysis of female earnings, 
the number of regressors usually included is large. Given that the LMAS does 
not give a detailed age and a detailed level of schooling, we use the industry 
and occupation ( at the time of the job separation). As our objective is to 
estimate the structural parameters of the effects of young children on search 
costs and reservation wages, we do not give a structural interpretation of the 
regressors included in the mean wage offer equation but rather incorporate all 
relevant information which allows us to control for individual endowments in 
human capital. For this reason, we parametrize the parameter of the offer 
distribution as a function of education binary variables (primary and univer­
sity are dummy variables indicating the highest degree attained by a given 
woman). Note that the most important groups (those who have a high school 




























































































follows; primary (including agriculture, forestry and fishing), manufacturing, 
transportation/communications and Services (including trade, finance and ad­
ministration). Manufacturing has been used as the reference group. We have 
three (3) occupation categories; White Collars, Blue Collars and Professionals. 
Those employed in farming related occupations are excluded from the analysis.
Finally, in some cases, we implement versions of the model where educa­
tion also raises the productivity at home, we specify the value of non market 
time as
r  =  exp(ro 4- Tiprim ary  +  ^ u n iv e r s i t y )
4 The Canadian Labour Market A ctiv ity  Sur­
vey
The sample analyzed in this paper is drawn from the 1986-1987 Canadian labour 
Market Activity Survey (LMAS). The LMAS is a longitudinal data set where 
the basic unit of observation is the job held by the respondent. The sample used 
contains only male and female workers who held a full time job and experienced 
a permanent job displacement. The notion of displacement used in the paper 
includes layoffs for non-seasonal reasons, plant closure, end of a temporary job 
and a dismissal by the employer. It is therefore consistent with the notion of 
displacement used in the empirical literature. In the LMAS, the duration of 
unemployment is computed from the difference between the starting week of 
the new job (when applicable) and the week of termination of the previous 
job. As documented by Jones and Riddell (1995), the exact nature of the 
non-employment spell is not clear. Every individual is asked to report their 
weekly status (whether they are searching, not searching but willing to work 
or simply not available to work) so the post-displacement status is actually a 
complex sequence of states which, in many cases, might not be consistent with a 
stationary search model where individuals decide (upon displacement) to search 
or not. However, in order to estimate our model, we rely on the information 
provided by individuals when asked if they were available for work over the 
entire period of non-employment. Those reporting that they were not available 
at all during the non-employment period are considered as non-participants 
(those who are not searching)
In the LMAS, hourly wages as well as hours per week are reported for all 
jobs sampled. This allows us to construct a measure of the level of unemploy­




























































































so, we use the fact that, in 1986, the maximum insurable earnings were 495$ 
per week and the replacement ratio was 60%. On top of the information on the 
decision to search, upon-employment duration and accepted wages, the LMAS 
reports information on the number of young children so that we can identify 
those women who had children when displacement took place. We also observe 
the marital status (whether married , divorced, single or cohabitating) so that 
lone mothers and married mothers can be analyzed separately.
In this paper, we focus on young and prime-age workers (less than 45 years 
old). Around 41% of the women are under 25, 40% are between 25 and 34 and 
19% between 35 and 44 years old. More than 75% of the women were actually 
working in the Service industry while around 14% were in the Manufacturing 
industry. The large majority of the women in the sample (82%) work in white 
collar occupations while around 16% are employed in blue collar occupations. 
The education background of the women of the sample is as follows. About 
8% only have completed at most a high school degree while 33% have attended 
university. The majority (59%) reports having completed a post-secondary 
degree ( technical school).Censoring is quite important in the data. Among 833 
women aged below 45, 275 only had found a new job by the end of the survey. 
The remaining 558 women are split between those who were still searching at 
the end of the survey and those who report not searching after the loss of their 
previous job.
For males, the age breakdown is as follows. Around 30% of males are 
below 20 while 43% are between 25 and 34 and 27% are between 35 and 44. 
As expected male displaced workers are found in every industrial classifications; 
15% in primary industries, 20% in manufacturing, 26% in Communications and 
Transportation and 40% in the Services industry. White collar workers represent 
30% of the males while 62% of the males work in blue collar occupations. The 
remaining 8% is employed in occupations related to farming. Among the 545 
males included in our sample, 12% have completed at most a high School degree, 
43% a post secondary degree and 24% have attended university.
The following table (Table 1) illustrate the characteristics of the men and 































































































Mean St. Dev. Mean St. dev.
Unemp. Dur. (weeks) 22.5 (16.1) 20.2 16.1
Dur. Prev. Job (weeks) 67.6 (129.2) 160.8 210.9
Prev. wage (weeks) 
UI Benefit
6.37$ (3.08) 10.10 $ 4.70
#  of Children .33 - 0.59 -
Acc. wage (per hour) 7.14$ 9.46 $ 4.42
% attended university. 33% 24% -
% not searching 6% 5%
% found a new job 275/833 277/545
5 Empirical R esults
The set of results presented are grouped in three sub-sections. In section 5.1, 
we present estimates of the structural models obtained separately for males and 
females. In section 5.2, we present pooled estimates which can illustrate gender 
differences in various parameters. Finally, in section 5.3, we present separate 
estimates by gender in order to illustrate how the presence of young children 
affect search outcomes of males and females differently.
5.1 Estimates by Gender
As a first step, we estimate a representative agent version of the model for both 
males and females. The results are in Table 2A. The model is specified under 
the assumption that the presence of young children only affects the value of 
non-market time. Neither search costs nor offer probabilities are allowed to 
depend on child status. The results reveal some interesting differences between 
males and females; there is a much more significant level of heterogeneity in the 
value of non market time among women than among men, women face much 
higher search costs (2.88 dollars versus 1.83) and women receive offers much 
less frequently than males (the probability of receiving an offer is.047 per week
6W ages and  unem ploym ent insurance benefit a re  on  a per hour basis. All 




























































































for females while it is .144 for males). Interestingly, the difference between 
the mean wage offer for males and females is very small; 3.65 $ for males and 
3.42 $ for females. This implies a gender wage gap of 6.7% in offered wages. 
However, because females seem to face higher search costs and receive offers 
less frequently, their discounted expected lifetime earnings will clearly be lower 
and so will their reservation wages.
Table 2- Representative Agent Model
Age Group (Males) (Females)
Parameter Coef. (T-Ratio) Coef. (T-Ratio)
Unobs. heterogeneity (a) 5.047 (0.84) 3.64 (2.58)
Home Productivity (r) 0.262 (0.32) 0.378 (1.71)
Search Costs (7 ) 1.83 (1.02) 2.882 (2.57)
Offer Probability (£) 0.144 (2.64) 0.047 (4.52)
Wage offer (A) 0.274 (7.96) 0.292 (8.98)
Log Likelihood -640.7 -1014.6
Sample size 494 794
5.2 Pooled Estimates
As the estimates of Table 2 suggest that female and males might face different 
search parameters, it is natural to pool males and females and investigate more 
precisely which of the parameters are more likely to explain male/female dif­
ferences in wages. Furthermore, our estimates of the wage gender gap can be 
improved substantially by incorporating observed heterogeneity. In Table 3, we 
present estimates obtained when the mean wage offer, the value of non-market 
time and the offer probability (A,r and £) are function of a gender binary vari­
able (1 for male and 0 for female) and where both r, A and £ are allowed to 
be function of education classes (primary, secondary (the reference group) and 
university).7 We also incorporate industry dummies and occupation dummies 
in A.
The estimates are presented for all males and females column 1, all males 
and females with no children (in column 2) and all males and females with
TIn some cases, we have also allowed search costs to be different for males and females but 
we never found any evidence of gender differences in search costs. To restrict the number of 




























































































children in column 3. From the results in column 1, we can see that those 
individuals with university training (-.8315) are actually more productive at 
home in the presence of children but that male/female differential in home 
productivity are basically inexistent. However, wage offers are significantly 
higher for males than females (-.2784 for Xmaies) and, moreover, males receive 
offers much more frequently ({mate =  .7502).
A possible (and plausible) explanation for the existence of male/female 
differential in reservation wages is the presence of young children. In column 2 
and 3, we have analyzed males and females together according to whether or 
not they have young children. The results indicate that males are more produc­
tive at home as well as in the labor market (Xmaie and Tmaie are both negative 
significant). This is true for those with and without children. However, the esti­
mates for the male/female differential in offer probability (£mo/e) reveal a huge 
difference between those with and without children. Males and females with no 
children face a similar offer probability (£ma(e = .1370 and is insignificant) while 
females with children receive offers at a much lower rate ({male = 1.33) and 
males. Given that male/female differences in wage offer are almost identical for 
those with and without children, these results imply that child status at job 
displacement is a strong component of the gender wage gap. A natural step to 
undertake is therefore to formulate our search model so that search costs and 




























































































Table 3 - Gender Differences in Job Search Parameters (Pooled Estimates)8
-l- -2- -3-
All W ith  Children No Children
P a r a m e te r C o /T ra t io C o /T r a t io C o /T r a t io
Non-market tim e a 4.3259 (6.01) 3.4919 (2.24) 2.6529 (3.84)
Tin tercep t -0.9167 (2.44) -0.9561 (1.96) -1.2844 (3.72)
T u n ive rs ity -0.8315 (2.17) 0.1557 (0.17) -0.9236 (3.24)
T m ale -0.2677 (0.88) -0.6753 (1.93) -0.5343 (2.58)
Search Costs ~Ìin tercep t 2.5653 (3.79) 2.6278 (3.71) 1.8836 (0.88)
7 m ale - - -
Offer Prob. £in tercep t -3.4729 (10.82) -2.3391 (3.73) -2.8390 (7.42)
£p r im a ry 1.2912 (1.96) 0.0300 (0.02) 0.6712 (0.74)
£ u n iv e rs ity 1.6824 (3.54) -1.1594 (1.55) 0.3655 (0.71)
Ornale 0.7502 (2.29) 1.3327 (1.88) 0.1370 (0.33)
Wage offer ^ in te rc ep t -1.3290 (10.83) -0.7572 (4.12) -1.0913 (7.27)
^ m a le -0.2784 (2.88) -0.6681 (3.09) -0.5814 (3.87)
Log Lik. -1264.6 -397.8 -860.4
5.3 Young Children and the Gender Wage Gap
The last group of estimates presented are those obtained when we investigate 
how the presence of young children affect male/female search behaviour. In 
order to illustrate those difference, we consider the cases where search costs 
and offer probabilities are parameterized as a function of the number of young 
children and compare estimates obtained for males and females separately. In 
order to take into account that those individuals with higher education have 
possibly a higher value of non-market time, we still allow r  to be function of 
education dummies and an intercept using an exponential function.
The results are quite explicit about gender differences and the presence of 
young children. First, we note that the value of non market time is significantly 
different for females with university training (a very plausible result) while ,for 
males, it seems independent from education. More importantly, the probability 8
8T o save space, th e  param eter estim ates for industry  and occupation  (in A) 




























































































of receiving a job offer is significantly lower for females with children (-.4071 
in column 1 and -1.0248 in column 3). This implies that females with children 
face a lower value of search than females with no children or males and that, 
as a consequence, the optimal reservation wage is also lowered by the presence 
of young children. Interestingly, women with young children do not face signifi­
cantly higher search costs; the estimates indicate that females without children 
face search costs of the order of 1.20$ per hour while those with children face 
search costs of the order of 1.35$ per hour. However, as pointed out in Belzil 
and Zhang (1995), this result might be explained by the equality of child care 
costs arrangements while employed and unemployed.






Non-market time G 5.2699 (1.24) 5.3956 (1.23) 4.2850 (1.84)
T in ie r
T prim -0.0779 (0.07) -.0444 (0.04) .4575 (0.71)
T un iv 0.2581 (0.14) 0.2420 (0.15) -0.29 (0.22)
Search Costs9 W inter 2.2836 (1.60) 1.6656 (1.20) 1.6414 (0.22)
7 child - 0.1255 (0.04) 0.1550 (0.06)
Offer Prob. Winter -2.5834 (5.05) -2.4251 (4.45) -2.3750 (4.46)
(.C hild -.0060 (0.05) - -0.1312 (1.52)
Log Lik, -556.6 -554.7 -550.5








Non-market time a 3.0707 (4.29) 3.9316 (4.17) 4.5988 (4.79)
T in ie r -0.8374 (2.93) -0.9498 (2.09) -0.7785 (2.69)
T prim .3416 (1.33) 0.5733 (1.47) 0.3396 (0.51)
T un iv -.8509 (3.04) -0.5449 (1.31) -0.7299 (2.22)
Search costs I x n ie r 2.5773 (3.67) 2.3738 (3.70) 2.2717 (2.79)
I C h ild - 0.1527 (0.58) 0.1522 (0.37)
Offer prob. t i n ie r -2.9019 (7.53) -2.6526 (7.25) -1.4648 (3.66)
f C hild -.4071 (5.37) - -1.0248 (10.20)





























































































The fact that males tend to earn more than females is a stylized fact present 
in all industrialized countries. Several explanations, reviewed in the introduc­
tion section, have been proposed by labor economists. In this paper, we have 
proposed a new approach to the issue; namely, we have investigated how the 
job search process may differ across males and females. Using a structural job 
search model with endogenous search, we have estimated how differences in 
structural parameters can affect the discounted expected lifetime earnings of 
unemployed females and found that the presence of young children plays an im­
portant role in the setting of the optimal reservation wage. Indeed, there is very 
little evidence that the value of non-market time of females is higher than for 
males. Our estimates imply that females with no children are quite identical to 
male workers and are therefore consistent with the claim that the gender wage 
gap is typically small when males and females enter the labor market but tend 
to increase with age (or experience).
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